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THE WHEAT REPORT PROPOSALS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission formed an internal study
group in November, 1967, to examine the operation of the disclosure pro-
visions of the Securities Act of 19831 (hereinafter referred to as the '33
Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (hereinafter referred to as the
'34 Act), and SEC rules and regulations thereunder.3 This study group
(hereinafter referred to as the Study) was under the direction and super-
vision of SEC Commissioner Francis M. Wheat. In March, 1969, the Study
made its report to the SEC of its findings and proposals. The report is
entitled Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies
under the '33 and '34 Acts, but is more commonly known as the Wheat Re-
port. The scope of this comment will be to examine and evaluate the Study's
proposals in regard to: (1) the form and content of '33 Act prospectuses;
(2) the dissemination of '33 Act prospectuses; (3) the use of publicity
to create interest in the sale of a new security before a registration state-
ment, as required by the '33 Act, is filed for that security (i.e., the prob-
lem of "gun jumping"); (4) secondary transactions; and (5) brokers' trans-
actions.
f1. BACKGROUND
A. The '33 and '34 Acts
The '33 Act deals mainly with the initial distribution of securities
which are offered to the public through the mails or channels of interstate
commerce.4 Disclosure provisions require that a registration statement con-
taining information about the security, the issuer, and the underwriter be
filed with the SEC; and that a prospectus, containing much the same in-
formation, be given to the buyer of the security. To enforce this disclosure,
the '83 Act creates civil and criminal liabilities if material misstatements or
omissions are made in the registration statement or prospectus. An exemp-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964). Section numbers will be used in the text of
this comment corresponding to the section numbers of the '33 and '34 Acts as orig-
inally passed by Congress. The section numbers as found in Title 15, United States
Code, will be given in footnotes.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
3. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4885 (Nov. 27, 1967).
4. The '33 Act also contains anti-fraud provisions which apply if the security
is offered or sold through the mails or channels of interstate commerce whether the
security is part of an initial distribution or is part of normal market trading.
(188)
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tion from the requirements of a registration statement and prospectus is
given to certain types of securities and securities transactions. 5
The '34 Act deals primarily with the post-distribution trading of se-
curities. Federal regulation of securities exchanges and markets is estab-
lished by the act. Disclosure sections include provisions to compel corpora-
dons to furnish the SEC with adequate information as to securities publicly
traded and provisions to control unfair use of information by corporate in-
siders. Although the Study's recommendations concerning disclosure under
the '34 Act are not directly within the scope of this comment, some pro-
posals under the '33 Act are practicable only if proposals affecting dis-
closure under the '34 Act are adopted. Therefore, some consideration must
be given to the recommendations under the '34 Act that interrelate to those
under the '33 Act.
B. Reasons for the Need for Changes in Disclosure Policies
The primary reasons for the disclosure provisions in the '33 Act were:
(1) to provide adequate and accurate information to prospective investors
of the character and nature of the security in which they are to invest, and
(2) to prevent fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securities.6 While
the authority of the SEC to require the disclosure of certain information is
readily accepted, there has been considerable critical comment and analysis
of the present disclosure policies.7 In addition, the Study felt a re-examina-
tion of disclosure policy necessary for a number of other reasons. First,
the American shareholder population has increased from 6,490,000 in 1952,
to 26,400,000 in 1968. Accompanying this growth has been a vast increase
in the number of investment decisions which are based, directly or in-
directly, on information disclosed by corporations. Second, an increased
demand for accurate and adequate disclosure has resulted from an in-
crease in professionalism within the investment business. Third, the 1964
amendments to the '34 Act (which generally added the requirement of dis-
closure to qualifying securities traded in over-the-counter transactions)
have made it more practicable to integrate the disclosure required by the
'33 and '34 Acts. Finally, faster, less expensive methods of distributing to
interested parties the information disclosed to the SEC are now available,
mainly through use of the microfiche system.8
5. Section 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964), and § 4, 15 U.S.C. 77d (1964), of the '33
Act exempt certain securities and transactions.
6. H.R. RP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
7. See, e.g., Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1340
(1966); Heller, "Integration" of the Dissemination of Information Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
749 (1964); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L. REv. 607
(1963); Flanagin, The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-In Stockholder, 63
MicH. L. Rxv. 1139 (1965); Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary
Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1043 (1964).
8. SEC, DiscLosuRE To INVESTORs-A RAPP A sAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
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III. CHANGES PROPOSED iN THE WHEAT REPORT
A. Form and Content of the '33 Act Prospectuses
There are four types of prospectuses permitted or required to be used
by the '33 Act and SEC rules and regulations thereunder.9 Section 5 (b) of
the '83 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... (2)
to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery
after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that
meets the requirements of subsection (a) of [section 10].10
A prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10 (a) is referred to as
a "statutory" prospectus form and is the subject of most of the Study's pro-
posed changes in prospectus and content."1 The purpose of the statutory
prospectus is to provide essential information to a potential investor and
thus enable the potential investor to make his investment decision more
intelligently.
SEC rules also require that the content of a prospectus be "dearly
understandable" and expressed in condensed or "summarized form" in
"reasonably short paragraphs or sections."'1 Despite these requirements,
there has long been a problem of issuers using prospectuses that are so long
and complex that the average investor cannot readily understand them. As
a means of combating this problem, the Study recommended that the SEC
decline to review and refuse to accelerate a registration statement that in-
dudes an "unnecessarily long, complex or verbose prospectus."'3 Although
the standards for determining when a prospectus is "unnecessarily long,
complex or verbose" are not given by the Study, the Study recommended
the following as means of making a prospectus shorter and more readable:
(1) negative statements in the prospectus that are in response to required
items of disclosure in the registration forms should be eliminated; (2) in-
formation should not be repeated in different parts of the prospectus unless
it is absolutely essential to fair disclosure; (3) the description of a com-
9. These four types are a "Preliminary Prospectus" allowed by Rule 438, a
"Summary Prospectus" allowed by Rule 434, a "Summary Prospectus" allowed cer-
tain issuers by Rule 434A, and the "Statutory Prospectus" required by section 5b.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (b) (1964).
11. The contents of a statutory prospectus are expressly prescribed in § 10 (a),
15 U.S.C. § 77j (a) (1964), and Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964), of the '88 Act.
However, the SEC is given authority by § 10 (d), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (d) (1964), to pre-
scribe additional information, or permit any of the prescribed information to be
omitted, as the SEC deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
12. SEC Securities Act Rule 431 (b), (d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.481 (b), (d) (1969).
13. WHEAT REPORT 80. While the study culminating the Wheat Report was
being made, the SEC implemented "temporary" procedures to eliminate the backlog
of registration statements. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 4934 (Nov. 21, 1969),
the SEC stated they would no longer comment or review a registration statement
that was "poorly prepared or otherwise presents problems." Thus, it seems that if
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pany's business should be appropriately condensed; and (4) further tech-
niques for condensation of the financial statements of large and complex
corporations should be developed by the SEC.' 4
1. A "Guide" to Long Prospectuses
The Study recognized that to provide fair disclosure some prospectuses
are necessarily longer than others. Therefore, if the "text" of a prospectus
is over ten pages in length,' 5 the Study recommended that a "Guide" to the
prospectus be required in lieu of a table of contents.' 6 The recommended
guide would be limited to one or two pages, would be a highly condensed
summary of the prospectus, in narrative form, and would contain refer-
ences to pages where the information is given in greater detail.
2. Use of Form S-7
In an effort to simplify the process of security registration and to
simplify the prospectus required for the distribution for certain issues, the
SEC adopted registration Form S-7 in November, 1967.17 The SEC's theory
in adopting Form S-7 was that adequate disclosure in specific areas could
be made in reports and proxy statements filed with the SEC over the years
pursuant to the '34 Act. To use Form S-7, a registrant among other things
must be a reporting company under section 12 of the '34 Act.'8 Thus,
Form S-7 was designed to coordinate the disclosure requirements of the '33
and '34 Acts, and made a simpler and faster means of registering a security
while maintaining the requirement of adequate disclosure.' 9
The Study reviewed the use of Form S-7 from the time of its adoption
and recommended that the category of companies eligible to use it be sig-
nificantly expanded, provided that improvements in disclosure under the
14. WHEAT REPORT 80-81.
15. The pages of the prospectus used for the financial statements (including
auditor's notes and opinions), the list of underwriters, and the cover page would
not be counted as pages of the text.
16. WHEAT REPORT 87. SEC Securities Act Rule 421c, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (c)
(1969), requires a table of contents to a prospectus.
17. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4886 (Nov. 29, 1967).
18. Along with just being a reporting company, the registrant must have com-
piled in timely fashion with the reporting and proxy solicitation requirements of the
'34 Act. Other important requirements include the following: (a) the registrant must
have been engaged in business the last five fiscal years; (b) a majority of the regis-
trant's board of directors must have been directors for at least three fiscal years;
(c) the registrant must not have been in default in payments on its indebtedness,
preferred stock, or long-term leases for the last ten years; (d) the registrant's con-
solidated sales or gross revenues must have totaled 50 million dollars for the last
fiscal year; (e) the registrant's consolidated after-tax net income for such year must
have been at least 2 million dollars; and (f the registrant's consolidated after-tax
net income for each of the preceding four fiscal years must have been at least one
million dollars. SEC Form S-7, 17 C.F.R. § 289.26 (1969).
19. The Study found that registration statements using Form S-7 were re-
viewed by the SEC within an average of 22 days, measured from the date of filing
until the date of effectiveness. In contrast to this, during the same period, the aver-
age time from filing to effectiveness for registration statements using Form S-1 was
from 6 to 8 weeks. WHEAT REP T 76.
1970]
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'34 Act recommended by the Study were adopted by the SEC. 20 In order
to expand eligibility to use Form S-7, the Study recommended two changes.
First, the requirement that "the registrant has been engaged in business of
substantially the same general character since the beginning of the last five
fiscal years" should be removed. The Study found that this requirement
had proven difficult to apply in practice and suggested that Item 5 (a) of
Form S-7 be revised by adding the following:
Unless the registrant has been engaged since the beginning of the
last five fiscal years in business of the same general character, de-
scribe the changes in the business during such five year period, in-
cluding the nature and effect of any materially important acquisi-
tion or disposition of property, any materially important changes
in the types of products or services rendered by registrant and its
subsidiaries, and any materially important changes in the mode of
conducting the business. 21
Second, the requirement of net income of 2.5 million dollars for the last
fiscal year and one million dollars for each of the four preceding fiscal years
should be reduced to $500,000.00 for each of the past five fiscal years. The
Study further recommended that the requirement of 50 million dollars in
sales or gross revenue for the last fiscal year be completely eliminated.
3. A "Short" Prospectus
For certain secondary offerings on exchanges, for stock to be issued by
reporting companies on the exercise of publicly held warrants, and for stock
to be issued by a corporation on conversion of the publicly held securities
of an affiliated corporation, the Study felt that even Form S-7 was unneces-
sarily long. Thus, the Study recommended that a short form prospectus be
developed and used in each of the above three situations.
Rule 153 presently permits the issuer or any underwriter to deliver to
a national securities exchange copies of a prospectus which will be furnished
to the exchange members on their request.22 For transactions between ex-
change members, delivery of the prospectus to the exchange is considered to
fulfill section 5 (b) (2) of the '33 Act's requirement that a sale be "pre-
ceded by a prospectus." In secondary distributions the Study was advised
that rarely, if ever, was a prospectus requested. As a practical matter, there
is no distinction between a company's securities offered in a secondary dis-
tribution and that company's other securities of the same class offered
simultaneously. Therefore, it was the Study's opinion that in the above
circumstances a registration statement (and form of prospectus) for sec-
ondary distributions of a reporting company would provide adequate dis-
closure through incorporating by reference the issuer's pertinent reports
and filings required under the '34 Act.2 3
When a person exercises a warrant, or exercises a conversion right, the
20. WHEAT REPORT 97.
21. Id. at 97-98.
22. SEC Securities Act Rule 153, 17 C.F.R. § 230.153 (1969).
23. WHEAT RFxORT 98-101.
[Vol. 35
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person is influenced primarily by the market price of the underlying se-
curity. This market price is the result of the collective decision of the pub-
lic, as to the value of the security based in theory on information previously
disclosed by the company. Therefore, there is little need to require the
delivery of a full prospectus at this time. The Study felt that a one or two
page prospectus document directing the reader to contain reports required
by the '34 Act to be on file with the SEC should, in the above circum-
stances, meet the prospectus requirement.
4. Proposals in Specific Areas
The Study also found that to adequately inform investors, more inform-
ative disclosures were needed in four particular areas. First the Study felt
that broader disclosure of business experience of directors and executive
officers should be required. Thus, it was recommended that information
relating to experience cover the last ten years rather than the present period
of five years, 24 and that the disclosure include any insolvencies or criminal
proceedings involving directors or executive officers of the registrant.25
Second, the Study recommended that appropriate standards be de-
veloped and included in Regulation S-X for a "source and application of
funds statement."2 6 This statement would be required to be in prospec-
tuses. 27
Third, the Study found that investors face great difficulty in ac-
curately comparing the earnings of one life insurance company to another,
a problem due largely to the accounting practices followed by the life in-
surance industry. For example, the cost of writing insurance policies and
collecting premiums is charged as an expense when incurred, but premiums
are taken into income over the life of the policy. As a result, expenses may
not be properly matched with revenues and the reported earnings of a
company that is writing an increasing volume of insurance will understate
the true earnings of the company. Conversely, if the company is writing a de-
creasing volume of insurance, earnings will be overstated. The Study found
that brokerage and advisory firms are presently using an adjustment
formula to determine the "true" earnings of insurance companies. Eight dif-
ferent formulae are used and each produces a different result. However,
since a committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants is at present conducting a study of the reporting problems of life
insurance companies in depth, the Study recommended that the SEC
await the results of this study before acting.28
24. SEC Securities Act Form S-1, Item 16, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1969).
25. WHEAT REPoRT 93-95.
26. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1969), are the SEC's accounting regulations.
27. This "source and application of funds statement" should not be confused
with a "cash flow statement" used by some companies, especially those engaged in
real estate investment. Cash flow statements generally show only funds generated
from the operation in question. The "source and application of funds statement"
would have two parts or sections. One section would show the source of funds; the
other would show fund expenditures.
28. WazAT R-EpORT 91-93.
1970]
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Finally, in 1968, the SEC proposed amendments further simplifying
the description of business done presently required to be in registration
Forms S-1 and S-7 under the '33 Act.29 At the time of the proposal item 9
of Form S-i and item 5 of Form S-7 required a brief description of the busi-
ness done and intended to be done by the registrant and its subsidiaries,
along with an indication of the relative importance of each line of business
which contributed 15 percent or more to the gross volume of business done
during the last fiscal year. The Study recommended that Forms S-1 and S-7
be amended as proposed, and the SEC did so amend the Forms in July,
1969.80
B. Dissemination of the '33 Act Prospectuses
A primary purpose of the '83 Act is to adequately inform potential in-
vestors, by the means of a prospectus, of the character and nature of the
security in which they may invest. The form and content of a prospectus
may be such that an average investor has the ability to understand and
make use of the information disclosed in arriving at an investment decision.
But, if the prospectus is not available to the investor until after he has ar-
rived at his decision to buy or not to buy, the prospectus is not serving the
purpose for which it was designed.
Two time periods are involved in the consideration of the dissemina-
tion of prospectuses. The first period is from the filing of the registration
statement to the time the registration becomes effective. The second period
is the time after the registration statement has bcome effective.
Three types of prospectus are permitted in the first period.3 1 These
are a "preliminary prospectus" allowed by Rule 433,82 a "summary pro-
29. SEC Securities Act Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1969), and SEC Form S-7,
17 C.F.R. § 239.26 (1969). The SEC proposed the amendments in SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4922 (September 4, 1968). Registration Forms S-1 and S-7 both re-
quire the issuer to disclose information to the SEC upon registration.
30. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8650 (July 14, 1969). Item 9 of Form S-1 and Item 5 of Form S-7 now require
a registrant to disclose the various lines of business of the registrant or its subsid-
iaries which contributed ten percent or more to its sales or earnings for the past five
years. Details must be given for the ten most important lines of business. If the
registrant has less than *50 million total sales, only separate lines of business which
contributed over fifteen percent to sales or earnings need to be reported.
Form 10 under the '34 Act, which is the form for registering a security under
§ 12 of the '34 Act, was also so amended.
31. Section 5 (b) (1) allows the use of any prospectus during this period that
meets the requirements of § 10. Thus, at first glance it would seem that a § 10(a)
prospectus ("statutory" prospectus) could be used. The '33 Act does not forbid the
use of a § 10(a) prospectus during this period, but, as a practical matter you cannot
have a prospectus that meets the requirements of § 10 (a) until the registration be-
comes effective.
32. SEC Securities Act Rule 433, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (1969). This prospectus
is required to contain substantially the same information as a § 10 (a) prospectus
except pricing information. The prospectus is required to bear the caption "Pre-
liminary Prospectus" and a statement to the effect that a registration statement has
been filed but is not yet effective. Both caption and statement must be printed in




Elliston: Elliston: Securities Regulation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
COMMENTS
spectus" allowed by Rule 434,83 and a "summary prospectus" allowed by
Rule 434A.34 The only prospectus that the '33 Act requires to be given an
investor is set forth in section 5 (b) which makes it unlawful for any per-
son to use the mails or interstate commerce to carry "any security for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale unless accompanied or preceded by
a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10"
(a statutory prospectus). 5 Thus, oral offers and acceptances for the sale of
securities can be made in the period before registration becomes effective
without a prospectus, since the investor does not receive the mandatory
statutory prospectus until a written confirmation of the sale is sent or the
security itself is delivered. Yet, it is during the post registration pre-effective
period that a prospectus is most needed.
The void created by lack of such a prospectus could be filled by the
preliminary prospectus, which will contain the first comprehensive dis-
closures about the issuer. Nevertheless, when the Study investigated the
use of the preliminary prospectus during this pre-effective period, it found
that under present practices the preliminary prospectus was not finding
its way into the hands of a significant number of ultimate investors. 36 This
is particularly alarming since it includes a large number of investors in
first public offerings by issuers about whom very little is ordinarily known.
1. Wider Dissemination of Preliminary Prospectuses
The Study felt that, to the extent practicable, all prospective investors
in a first public offering should receive a copy of the preliminary prospec-
tus at a reasonable time in advance of the effective date, and well in advance
of the mailing to the investor of a confirmation of sale. The Study realized
that this requirement could not be absolute and must be flexible. For ex-
ample, if a person becomes a prospective investor immediately before the
registration is to become effective, and will receive a statutory prospectus
when the registration becomes effective, it would not be sensible to hold
up the effectiveness of the registration by requiring delivery of the pre-
liminary prospectus.
In order to insure complete dissemination of information, while at the
same time maintaining the needed flexibility, the Study recommended cer-
33. SEC Securities Act Rule 434, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (1969). This prospectus
must be prepared by an independent organization primarily engaged in publishing
statistical and financial information. The prospectus must contain the same basic
information as a Rule 433 Preliminary Prospectus but is allowed to be in summary
form. At one time it was common for these prospectuses to be printed on small blue
cards. Thus, a Rule 434 prospectus is often called a "Blue Card" prospectus.
34. SEC Securities Act Rule 434A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434a (1969). This rule al-
lows registrants that are required to report by the '34 Act who meet other qualifica-
tions to publish a summary type prospectus.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (b) (1964).
36. Preliminary prospectuses delivered to underwriters averaged 50 prospectuses
per underwriter in the case of first public offerings and 67 prospectuses per under-
writer in the case of repeated offerings, with the low being one prospectus per
underwriter in both categories. Delivery of the preliminary prospectus to dealers
averaged 4 per dealer for first offerings and 1.7 per dealer for repeated offerings.
In several instances the Study found that no copies of the preliminary prospectus
had been delivered to dealers. WuEAT REPORT 112.
1970]
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tain additional requirements that would have to be met before there could
be acceleration under Rule 460.37 The managing underwriter would be
required to furnish the SEC a written statement to the effect that copies of a
preliminary prospectus have been, or are being, distributed to all under-
writers and dealers expected to participate in the offering. This distribu-
tion of prospectuses must be timely enough to enable each underwriter or
dealer to mail, within a reasonable time before the requested effective date,
a copy of the preliminary prospectus to all persons to whom the under-
writer or dealer expects to mail a confirmation of sale after the effective
date. A "reasonable time" should ordinarily not be less than 48 hours. The
managing underwriter's written statement would also affirm that it had
been advised by each underwriter or dealer that the necessary distribution
had been, or would be, made immediately after copies of the preliminary
prospectus had been received by the underwriter or dealer. The Study
recommended, however, that until there could be a review of the effective-
ness of this new requirement as a condition to acceleration, the requirement
should apply only to first public offerings.
2. A Rule under Section 15c (2) of the '84 Act
Section 15c (2)38 of the '34 Act allows the SEC to "prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. In order to further insure dissemination of pro-
spectuses, the Study proposed that the SEC promulgate a rule under sec-
tion 15c (2) which would make it a "deceptive act or practice" for a broker
or dealer not to take "reasonable steps" to furnish a prospectus (prelim-
inary), amended preliminary, or final) to any person upon written request.
Brokers and dealers would also have to take reasonable steps to furnish at
least one copy of the preliminary prospectus to associated persons (sales-
men) who are expected to solicit orders for the security prior to the
effective date, and before the solicitation of such orders. At least one copy
of the final prospectus would have to be delivered to salesmen expected to
solicit orders after the effective date, before the salesman solicits orders.
The managing underwriter would be under an obligation to take reason-
able steps to furnish all other underwriters and dealers with sufficient
copies of the prospectus to enable the underwriters and dealers to comply
with delivery requirements.
3. Post-effective Prospectus Delivery Requirements for
Non-reporting Issuers
As previously stated, section 5 of the '83 Act requires that delivery of
a statutory prospectus accompany or precede the confirmation of the sale
37. SEC Securities Act Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1969). The SEC's policy
concerning acceleration of the effective date of registration statements is presently
found in Rule 460, Rule 461, and SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9,
1968), containing "Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration State-
ments." If Rule 460 is amended as recommended by the Study, Rule 461 and Re-
lease No. 4936 could be rescinded.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
[Vol. 35
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of a security or the delivery of the security. Section 4 (3) of the '33 Act
exempts a transaction by a dealer from the above requirements of section 5.
However, section 4 (3) does not apply to any transaction in the security
that takes place within 40 days (90 days in the case of a first public offer-
ing) of either the effective date of the registration statement, or the date
of the first bona fide offer to the public whichever is earlier.3 9 Although
this requirement of delivery of a statutory prospectus after the effective
date applies to both first public offerings and offerings of reporting com-
panies, the Study found that circumstances should require a differentiation
between first public offerings and offerings of reporting companies in regard
to post-effective prospectus delivery requirements.
In the case of a first public offering there is no repository of informa-
tion about the issuer as there is with a reporting company. In fact, the
prospectus will be the only source of information available to the investor
for a substantial period of time in the case of a first public offering. 40
Therefore, it was the Study's opinion that, in the case of non-reporting is-
suers, the post-effective requirement of prospectus delivery serves as an
important disclosure method and should not be changed.
As to reporting company issuers, the Study recommended that the post-
effective requirement for prospectus delivery be removed if those improve-
ments in reporting under the '34 Act recommended by the Study are
adopted by the SEC. The Study felt that section 4 (3) (B) of the '33 Act
gave the SEC the authority to remove the requirement. 41
C. The "Gun Jumping" Problem
Assuming that the form, content, and dissemination of prospectuses are
adequate in all respects, the purpose of the '33 Act, to provide disclosure
of information to potential investors through the means of a prospectus
before the investor has reached his investment decision, will be frustrated
if the market is allowed to be "conditioned" or "aroused." The statutory
design of the '33 Act is that any written offering of a security, that is not
exempt from registration, shall be made by means of a prospectus. A
prospectus is defined very broadly in section 2 (10) as any written material,
or statement on radio or television, which offers a security for sale.42 Sec-
tion 5c of the '33 Act prohibits any offering before the registration state-
ment is filed.43 Section 5b (1) provides that after the registration statement
has been filed, a prospectus may be used if it meets the requirements of
section 10 of the '33 Act.44 The SEC has interpreted these sections to mean:
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (3) (1964).
40. This is because, assuming the '34 Act requires the issuer to report, the first
annual report (Form 10-K) would not be due until after the first full fiscal year
following the last full fiscal year for which certified financial statements were pro-
vided in the prospectus. The semi-annual report (Form 9-K) and the quarterly
report (Form 7-K, if required) would not be filed with the SEC until after the re-
quirement of delivery of a prospectus for 90 days had expired.
41. Section 4 (3) (B) establishes the post-effective requirement of 40 days "or
such shorter period as the Commission may specify." 15 U.S.C. § 77d (3) (B) (1964).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (10) (1964).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (c) (1964).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
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The statute ['38 Act] prohibits issuers, underwriters and dealers
from initiating a public sales campaign prior to the filing of a
registration statement by means of publicity efforts which, even
though not couched in terms of an express offer, conditioned the
public mind or aroused public interest in a particular security. 45
This interpretation has become known as the "gun jumping" doctrine.
Any publicity of a forthcoming offering designed to procure orders for
the security is "jumping the gun" whether the publicity is by interviews
with newspaper or magazine reporters, speeches, reports to shareholders,
market letters, or otherwise.
As a practical matter, the "gun jumping" doctrine has been extremely
difficult to apply so as to restrain publicity about an issuer in the regis-
tration process. In recent years there has been a significant increase in the
interest and participation of the public in the security markets. This has
brought about the practice of large corporations publishing more and more
information about their affairs and an increase in the publication by the
brokerage community of market letters, recommended lists, industry sur-
veys, and similar publications.
The flow of information to investors and prospective investors is partly
in response to their demands. If controlled, it constitutes a means for the
dissemination of information about issuers and the issuer's securities to the
investing public. If the restrictions of the "gun jumping" doctrine are
carried too far, it can prevent or inhibit publicity which is beneficial to
the interest of investors.
The Study thus felt there is a need for clearer standards "to differen-
tiate between helpful and informative publicity and publicity primarily
designed to 'condition' the market in such a way that the disclosure in
the prospectus would be rendered ineffective." 40 In determining these
standards, a balance must be struck between the interests of investors to
whom securities are sold in registered public offerings and investors that
purchase and sell securities in the trading markets.
1. Publicity Generated by the Issuer of Securities "In Registration"
The SEC has set forth the following standard to determine whether
the restrictions of the "gun jumping" doctrine should apply:
In the normal conduct of its business a corporation may continue
to advertise its products and services without interruption, it may
send out its customary quarterly, annual and other periodic re-
ports to security holders, and it may publish its proxy statements,
send out its dividend notices and make routine announcements to
the press. This flow of normal corporate news, unrelated to a
selling effort for an issue of securities, is natural, desirable and en-
tirely consistent with the objective of disclosure to the public which
underlies the federal securities laws. 47
45. Carl M. Leob, Rhoads & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 848 (1959).
46. WHEAT REPORT 127.
47. Carl M. Leob, Rhoads & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 853 (1959).
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The Study found that this standard has worked reasonably well and makes
a sensible accommodation between the needs of the trading market for a
continuing flow of investment information and the underlying policies of
the '33 Act. Obviously there will at times be close and difficult questions
as to whether certain publicity is within this "normal and customary"
standard. The Study recommended that this "normal and customary"
standard be maintained. If the issuer has any doubt as to whether specific
publicity is within this standard, the Study recommended informal con-
sultation with the SEC to avoid any potential controversy (i.e., request
a "no-action" letter from the SEC).
A possible conflict may arise for an issuer between the restrictions
on publicity of the "gun jumping" doctrine on one hand, and the princi-
ples regarding "insider trading" and the duty developed in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. 48 and related cases to make timely disclosure of informa-
tion which might materially affect the market for its securities on the other.
The Study felt that if the issuer in good faith determines he is required
by Texas Gulf Sulphur to make a disclosure, the restrictions of the "gun
jumping" doctrine should not be applied if the disclosure is purely factual
and does not include predictions, conclusions, or opinions.
Inconsistent positions have been taken at various times by the SEC
on the question of whether an issuer is "jumping the gun" by announcing
the fact that it is contemplating the making of a public offering in securi-
ties required to be registered. For clarification of this point, the Study
recommended that Rule 13549 be amended to allow the issuer to give public
notice that it proposes to make a public offering.50 The information in the
notice would be restricted to identity of the security, the number of shares
(or other units) that the issuer expects to register, and the approximate
dollar amount of the proposed offering.
2. Publicity by Brokers and Investment Advisors
The Study found that no clear standards existed for applying the
restrictions of the "gun jumping" doctrine to publicity generated by
brokers and investment advisors. As a result, a wide diversity of views
exists among brokers and investment advisors as to when and to whom the
restrictions should apply. For example, one brokerage firm would refrain
from publishing a recommendation of a security in registration only if the
firm was to be included in the underwriting group. Another brokerage
firm would not publish a recommendation for any security of an issuer
in registration. Moreover, while one financial publisher felt it could not
publish opinions or recommendations in its regular subscription service
concerning a company in registration, another financial publisher recog-
nized no such restriction. 51
The Study noted there should be a difference in the restrictions ap-
plied to a participant and those applied to a non-participant in a public
48. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. SEC Securities Act Rule 135, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1969).
50. WHEAT R-PORT Appendix VII-2.
51. Id. at 137-38.
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offering regarding their publication activities. A non-participant distribut-
ing publications to the trading market is very likely to be making inde-
pendent judgments and recommendations, derived from research done by
independent financial publishers and independent research organizations,
concerning a company's securities. These publications serve the need of in-
forming the trading public.
a. Participants in a Public Offering
Many brokerage firms regularly publish a broad, general list of
securities which they recommend. The Study felt that to require a firm
to delete all references to an issuer or its securities because the issuer is in
the registration process for another security and because the firm expects
to participate in the distribution was extending the restrictions of the "gun
jumping" doctrine too far. Therefore, the Study recommended that the
SEC adopt a rule permitting publication by brokerage firms of recom-
mendations, opinions, or information about securities registered or to be
registered, regardless of whether the firm expects to participate in the dis-
tribution, providing certain conditions are met. These conditions include:
(1) the issuer has a class of securities registered under section 12 of the '34
Act; (2) the publication has been distributed with regularity, at least an-
nually, for the past two years; (3) the publication is one containing a
broad, general, and comprehensive list of securities that are currently rec-
ommended by the brokerage firm; (4) the recommendation, opinion, or in-
formation is given no greater space or prominence in the publication than
any other security; (5) the publication does not contain projections of sales
or earnings beyond the issuer's current fiscal year; and (6) a previous
publication by the brokerage firm, that was distributed before the firm
reached an agreement to participate in the distribution of the security
presently in registration, contained an opinion or recommendation of the
security that was no less extensive.52
In addition to the use of "recommended lists," as discussed above,
the Study felt that the restrictions of the "gun jumping" doctrine should
not be applied in any event to the use of information by brokerage firms
about the common stock of an issuer that was in the process of registering
a non-convertible senior security. The investment conditions and reasons
for investing in common stocks, as opposed to non-convertible senior securi-
ties, are significantly different. Moreover, the purchasers of non-converti-
ble senior securities are to a large extent institutions rather than persons.
Thus, the Study recommended a rule which would permit brokerage firms
to recommend common stock where the issuer is in the process of registering
non-convertible senior securities (or vice versa) provided that the issuer
meets the qualifications recommended by the Study for using Form S-7.53
Finally, a problem occasionally arises where a brokerage firm has
prepared and published a market letter or industry survey relating to an
issuer or security before the brokerage firm reaches any understanding
that the firm is to participate in an underwriting of an issuer's security.
If the number of copies published is no greater and the distribution no
52. Id. at 143-45, Appendix V-3.
53. Id. at 142-43, Appendix V-2. See text at III, A, 3 supra.
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more extensive than for similar publications issued by the firm in the recent
past, the Study felt that the "gun jumping" doctrine should not be applied.
Obviously there will be close questions and practical problems in applying
the above standard. If so, the Study recommended that informal advice,
i.e., a "no-action" letter, be sought from the SEC before participating in
the underwriting.
If the brokerage firm has recommended a security before agreeing to
participate in an underwriting of the security, and during the pre-filing
period events involving or affecting the issuer occur, the Study recom-
mended that the firm be allowed to issue brief factual reports of such
events. The reports could not contain any projections of sales or earnings,
or a recommendation to buy.
b. Non-Participants in a Public Offering
The restrictions of the "gun jumping" doctrine are applied to prevent
the potential investor from being misled by the market being "conditioned!"
or "aroused" to forthcoming distribution of a security. On the other hand,
non-participants in a public offering should be able to demonstrate that
their publications are designed and distributed for the purpose of stimu-
lating trading interest in particular existing securities and brokerage serv-
ices, and not for the purpose of "conditioning" the market or "arousing"
interest in a security that is "in registration." Moreover, if the brokerage
firm is not participating in the underwriting, the publications would usually
not be prepared and distributed in a context where extra compensation
could operate to affect the independent judgment of the brokerage firm
publisher about the security.
The Study felt that application of the "gun jumping" doctrine to
publications by non-participants could deprive potential purchasers of an
important source of independent opinion regarding the security being
distributed. Thus, the Study recommended that the restrictions of "gun
jumping" should not be applied to the publications of a non-participant.
This recommendation, however, raised a problem of defining a "non-
participant." Since relationships between brokers, dealers, and investment
advisors in the financial community are frequently complex and interre-
lated, it is often difficult as a practical matter to determine if a firm is
truly independent of the participants in a public offering. Therefore, to
be a non-participant and not subject to restrictions of "gun jumping," the
following qualifications, as set forth in the Study's proposed Rule 137,
would have to be met: (1) the issuer must have a class of securities regis-
tered under section 12 of the '84 Act; (2) no consideration can be received,
directly or indirectly, from the issuer, any member of the underwriting
group, or any member of the dealer group in connection with the publica-
tion; (8) there can be no arrangement or understanding, direct or indirect,
with the issuer, any underwriter, or dealer in connection with the publi-
cation; (4) the publication must be prepared, published, and distributed
in the regular course of business by someone who is not and does not pro-
pose to be a member of the underwriting or dealer group.54
54. Id. at 140-41, Appendix V-1.
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3. When Restrictions Should Commence for Brokers and
Investment Advisors
In the past, in determining if "gun jumping" restrictions should apply,
the SEC has employed a subjective standard centering around the question
of whether a broker has reason to believe that he will participate in a
forthcoming distribution. The Study recommended that this standard be
replaced by the more objective standard of when an "understanding" has
been reached. Thus, a broker would become subject to restriction upon
"reaching an understanding" with the issuer (or other person on whose
behalf a planned distribution is to be made) that the former will become
a managing underwriter, whether or not the terms and conditions of the
underwriting have been agreed upon. Similarly, a broker, other than the
managing underwriter, would become subject to restrictions when he
reaches an understanding with the managing underwriter, or with the
issuer or other person on whose behalf a planned distribution is to be
made, that he will participate in the underwriting.
D. Secondary Distributions
A secondary distribution of securities is a public selling of securities
obtained from the issuer, or a person in a control relationship to the issuer
(control person), in a private offering. The '83 Act requires registration
of all offers of securities made by any person to any other person unless
specifically exempted. Since the '38 Act is concerned with offerings to the
public rather than offerings limited to private investors who are able to
fend for themselves, specific exemptions are provided for the latter type
of offering. Thus, section 4 (2) of the '33 Act exempts from registration
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering," 55 and sec-
tion 4 (1) exempts "transactions by any person other than an issuer, under-
writer, or dealer."5 6 The problems involved in secondary distributions
are centered around the availability or non-availability of these two exemp-
tions. For example, Company A sells a block of its securities to B, an
individual. May Company A utilize the exemption of "not involving a
public offering" provided in section 4(2), and escape the requirement of
filing a registration statement? May B utilize the exemption provided in
section 4 (1) and resell the securities immediately without filing a registra-
tion statement? Also, if not immediately, how long does B have to hold
the securities before he may utilize the exemption?
Obviously B is neither an issuer nor a dealer. Thus, if the section 4 (1)
exemption is unavailable to him, he must be an "underwriter." The term
"underwriter" is defined in section 2 (11) of the '33 Act as "any person
who has purchased from an issuer, [or a control person] with a view to
... distribution.... ."57 Although the term "distribution" is not expressly
defined by the '33 Act, it has always been considered by the SEC to be
essentially synonymous with the term "public offering," as used in the sec-
tion 4 (2) exemption.58 Thus, in the above example the availability of the
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (1964).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) (1964).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1964).
58. L. Loss, SEcRrrms REG ATON 551 (2d ed. 1961).
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section 4 (2) exemption to Company A and the section 4 (1) exemption to B
turns on the "view" (i.e., the intent) with which B purchased the securi-
ties.
Because of these interpretations of the terms "underwriter" and "dis-
tribution," the SEC has always used a wholly subjective test to determine
if the section 4 (1) and 4 (2) exemptions are available. The test applied
has been whether the person who buys unregistered securities from the
issuer (or control person) has the view or intent of later reselling the
securities to the public. This test presents the obvious problem of how to
determine the purchaser's true intention. Issuers, purchasers, and the SEC
have in the past looked chiefly to three interrelated factors to determine
if an intent to "invest" or "distribute" was possessed by the purchaser at
the time of the purchase. These factors have been the presence of an
"investment letter," "change of circumstance" after the purchase, and the
length of time the securities have been held. However, the presence or
absence of any or all of these factors, in any degree, has not assured that
the SEC will find that the purchaser does or does not have an intent
either to "invest" or to "distribute."
An "investment letter" is a statement given by the purchaser in non-
public offerings to the issuer (or control person) which affirms that he is
purchasing the securities for investment purposes and not with a view to
distribution. The ritual of an investment letter has long been an estab-
lished practice in private offerings, although since the SEC's opinion in
Crowell-Collier,59 the value of such a statement as definite proof of an in-
tent to invest is very doubtful. In Crowell-Collier the SEC stated:
An issuer may not establish a claim to an exemption under sec-
tion 4 (1) merely by collecting so-called "investment representa-
tions" from a limited group of purchasers if in fact a distribution
by such persons occurs. 60
Nevertheless, an issuer would be careless in not obtaining an investment
letter since failure to do so might be deemed evidence of the issuer's dis-
regard for the significance of the purchaser's intent with respect to the
securities.61
The "change of circumstances" doctrine arose from cases where pur-
chasers tried to use facts subsequent to the purchase to demonstrate their
investment intent at the time of purchase and thus justify a resale of the
securities utilizing the section 4 (1) exemption. In other words, the pur-
chaser would contend that he had "investment intent" at the time of the
purchase, but because of a change of circumstances, it is now necessary to
resell the securities. What constitutes a sufficient change of circumstances
to allow the securities to be resold without registration has not been pre-
cisely determined. However, any change in circumstances that can reason-
ably be anticipated will definitely not be a sufficient change. Thus, in
59. SEC Securities Act Release No. 8825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
60. Id.
61. WHEAT POT 171-72.
1970]
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1970], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC62 it was held that it was not a sufficient change
of circumstances when investors anticipated business success but were dis-
appointed by the actual results. Also, it is apparent that the shorter the
time between purchase and resale, the more drastic the required change
must be.0 8
In Crowell-Collier the SEC also indicated that the length of time be-
tween purchase and subsequent resale of the securities would be "one
evidentiary fact" in determining if the purchaser had investment intent.64
However, no set length of time will definitely establish the necessary in-
vestment intent. Crowell-Collier stated that holding the securities for one
year would not automatically prove investment intent, and thus allow a
section 4 (1) exemption, although "the longer the period of retention, the
more persuasive would be the argument that the resale is not at variance
with original 'investment intent.' "6, Therefore, it is generally felt that
holding securities that were purchased in a private placement for a period
of two to three years after purchase will allow the use of the section 4 (1) ex-
emption, but even this cannot be stated with certainty.6
1. Consequences of the Present Standards
As can be seen from the above discussion, basing the availability of
the section 4 (1) and 4 (2) exemptions on the presence or absence of "invest-
ment intent" in the mind of the purchaser at the time of the purchase
creates much uncertainty. Moreover, when the test is "investment intent,"
such considerations as the number of shares involved or the need by the
next purchaser for the protection afforded by adequate disclosure becomes
irrelevant. For example, in the hypothetical noted earlier, if B can prove
the requisite "investment intent," he may sell all of the securities without
filing a registration statement (by utilizing the section 4(1) exemption)
regardless of the need of his purchasers for the protection given by adequate
disclosure.
More specifically, the Study felt there were four "consequences" of
the "investment intent" theory that were detrimental to the administration
of the securities laws. (1) The vague and imprecise standards of investment
intent have allowed large numbers of securities to be sold in interstate
commerce without adequately considering the need for disclosure. (2) The
lack of objective tests to determine when and how shares issued in a non-
public transaction may be offered publicly gives leeway to the unscrupulous
or unprincipled counsel to give opinions that certain offerings are exempt
from registration when in fact this may not be true. (3) An increasing
number of requests for "no action" letters involving the sale of securities
obtained in a private placement has placed an onerous burden on the
SEC. (4) The problems of proof by the SEC as to the lack of "investment
62. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896 (1959).
63. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities Law-A Programfor Reform, 116 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1323, 137 (1968).
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intent" at the time of purchase is extremely difficult, even in cases of flag-
rant violations, since intent to distribute must be shown. Purchasers and
issuers who in fact possessed the necessary intent at the time of purchase
are faced with the difficulty of dealing with a nebulous test in proving
such intent.67
2. Specific Proposals
In solving the problems of secondary distributions, the Study felt it
would be necessary to move away from several longstanding interpretations
of certain statutory language found in the '33 Act. It was the Study's opin-
ion that the statutory language of the '33 Act dealing with secondary
distributions should be given an interpretation which would reflect three
areas of emphasis. First, the interpretation would be more consistent with
the fundamental aim of the '33 Act in providing full and fair disclosure
of the character of the securities involved. Second, the interpretation would
reflect and utilize coordination between the disclosure requirements of the
'33 and '34 Acts. For example, it would be possible to permit some sec-
ondary sales of securities of companies required to report, and thus dis-
close, under the '34 Act when secondary sales of securities of a non-report-
ing company would not be allowed without disclosure. Finally, the
interpretation would assure a greater degree of predictability as to when
section 4 (1) and 4 (2) exemptions were available by replacing the present
subjective test of "investment intent" with tests as objective in character
as possible.68 In conjunction with this, the study recommended rules be
adopted by the SEC dealing with the terms "underwriter," "distribution,"
and "restricted security."
a. Certain Persons Deemed Underwriters
The term "underwriter" is defined in section 2 (11) of the '33 Act.
As discussed above, in determining if a person was an underwriter in a
secondary distribution, the emphasis has been on the "has purchased from
an issuer with a view to" part of the definition. The Study's proposed rule
would shift the emphasis to that part of the definition which reads:
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect partici-
pation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participa-
tion in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such under-
taking .... 69
Under the proposed rule, any person that disposes of a "restricted security"
in a "distribution" would be deemed an underwriter within the meaning
of section 2 (11).70 However, this would not be the exclusive definition of
an underwriter so that the investment banking firm performing a classic
underwriting function for an issuer, or control person, in the distribution
67. WHEAT REPORT 174-77.
68. Id. at 178.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1964).
70. WHEAT REPORT 204.
1970]
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1970], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of securities would still be an underwriter since the firm takes with a view
to distribution.71
The merit of the proposed rule is that it provides an objective test
in determining an underwriter in a secondary distribution. Regardless
of the state of mind or purity of intent at the time securities are purchased,
if the securities when disposed of are "restricted securities" (as discussed
below) and the disposition is a "distribution" (as discussed below), the
person is an underwriter. Thus, a person should know at the time he pur-
chases securities in a private placement how he can or cannot dispose of
them, and as a result would not have to rely on proving his intent or
waiting for a fortuitous change in circumstances.
b. Definition of New Term "Restricted Security"
Any security which was acquired directly or indirectly from an issuer,
or from any person in a control relationship to the issuer, in a transaction
or chain of transactions of which none was a public offering, would be a
"restricted security" by the Study's proposed rules. This taint of "restricted
security" would remain for a period of five years or until it was sold in a
public transaction. Any security obtained in a stock dividend, stock split-
up, or recapitalization when the original or exchanged securities were re-
stricted, would be similarly classified. To avoid the circumvention of the
rules by use of a shell corporation, one qualification to the rule that the
taint will be removed after five years is that the issuer must have been an
active, going business during the five year period. In this regard, an
issuer which has had annual gross revenues of 250 thousand dollars or
more from the conduct of its business for four of the five years will be
considered an active, going business.72
c. New Definition of "Distribution"
The term "distribution" is used in section 2 (11)'s definition of under-
writer, and although it is a key word in the meaning of that section, it is
not defined. In addition, Rule 154,73 dealing with the brokers exemption
of section 4 (4), is built around the term "distribution," but the rule has
no direct application to the problems of secondary distributions. Thus,
the Study felt it was essential to develop a definition of "distribution," as
used in section 2 (11), which would apply to sales of securities by control
persons and sales of securities by persons who have purchased the securi-
ties in a private placement. 74
In developing the definition, the Study focused on the need of pur-
chasers for the protection of disclosure which is given by registration of
offerings. Therefore, it was felt that a distinction should be made between
companies required by sections 1375 or 15 (d)76 of the '34 Act to make reports
71. Id.
72. WnEAT REPORT Appendix VI-1.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1969).
74. WHEAT REPORT 185.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
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to the SEC and non-reporting companies.77 If there has never been disclosure
by a company of its business history, earnings, financial condition, etc., then
obviously a sale of the company's securities to the public should be preceded
by disclosure through the registration process of the '33 Act. On the other
hand, if the company was a reporting company, and had thus previously
disclosed the pertinent information, the Study was of the opinion that sec-
ondary sales of the company's securities to the public should be permitted
if the quantity of the securities to be sold did not exceed an amount which
the trading market could normally be expected to absorb within a reason-
able period of time; and if no solicitation of buyers was necessary. With this
distinction in mind, the Study recommended a rule defining "distribution"
which would: (1) exclude non-public transactions from the term "distribu-
tion" and thus make registration of the securities involved unnecessary;
(2) include in the term "distribution" any public offering of the securities
of a company which is not subject to the appropriate reporting require-
ments of the '34 Act; and (3) exclude from the term "distribution" any
public offering of the securities of a company which is subject to the re-
porting requirements of the '34 Act and is not delinquent in filing of the
reports, provided the amount of securities involved and the method of sale
are not inconsistent with "ordinary trading."78
i. The Qualified List
Because the proposed definition of "distribution" distinguishes be-
tween reporting and non-reporting issuers, the Study felt that some method
of making the distinction should be readily available to interested persons.
Therefore, the Study proposed that the SEC formulate and maintain a
list of the issuers which have filed an informative registration statement
and are not delinquent in submitting the other significant reports required
by the '34 Act. This list, called the "Qualified List," would be kept current
at the SEC's headquarters and at each of its principal offices. The securi-
ties of any issuer on the "Qualified List" could be publicly sold without
registration in transactions not constituting a "distribution," i.e., if the
amount of securities involved and the method of sale is consistent with
ordinary trading.79
ii. "Public Offering" and "Ordinary Trading"
The Study recognized that this definition of distribution would create
the problems of deciding what is a public offering and what is ordinary
trading. In relation to the first problem, the Study conceded that there
would be close questions, as there is presently, involving the distinction
between public and non-public offerings but felt unable to formulate an
objective test of broad applicability that would eliminate the questions.
77. WHEAT REPORT 186. The study felt this distinction could only be made if
the proposals made by the Study for improved reporting under the '34 Act were
adopted by the SEC.
78. WHEAT REPORT Appendix VI-1.
79. Id. at 206-15.
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However, the Study did recommend efforts to find and develop such an
objective test.8 0
In defining ordinary trading, the Study considered Rule 15481 which
sets out quantitative tests for what is "ordinary trading" in determining
the availability of the so-called broker's exemption of section 4 (4). With
appropriate modifications, the Study was of the opinion that the general
framework of Rule 154 could also be used to determine what is ordinary
trading in connection with secondary distributions. The Study therefore
recommended that to qualify as ordinary trading no more than one per-
cent of the outstanding shares of a security that is traded over-the-counter
or, if the security is traded on an exchange, no more than the lesser of
either one percent of the outstanding securities of that class or one percent
of the reported volume of trading for any one week of the preceding four
weeks could be sold to the public in a secondary distribution by, or on
behalf of, any person within a six month period.8 2 Unlike Rule 154, any
securities sold in a private placement in the six-month period would not
be included in determining the quantity that could be sold. Although the
SEC had previously indicated that all sales by members of "a group of
closely related persons" would be deemed to be sales by any member of the
group,8 3 the Study recommended that only members of a carefully defined
family group be considered together for purposes of the quantity limita-
tion.8 4 Finally, the SEC has stated that if a plan existed to sell the max-
imum quantity permissible in each of several successive six month periods,
the sales would not be considered ordinary trading within Rule 154.85 The
Study recommended this limitation not be applied to sales within a sec-
ondary distribution.80
As to the "method of sale" that would be considered consistent with
ordinary trading, the Study proposed rules which differ from the present
interpretation of Rule 154 in three important areas. First, Rule 154 limits
the amount of commission that may be paid to "the usual or customary
brokerage commission."s Since there is a wide variance in the commission
that is charged in over-the-counter sales, this test is obscure at best. There-
fore, the Study recommended that the commission which could be paid,
and still be considered consistent with ordinary trading, be limited to
the minimum commission required by the exchange on which the se-
curity was listed. If the security was not listed but traded only over-
the-counter, the allowable commission would be the applicable minimum
New York Stock Exchange commission if the security had been listed.88
Second, Rule 154 prohibits all solicitation of buy orders except inquiry
that a broker may make of other dealers that have recently appeared in
80. Id. at 157.
81. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1969).
82. WHEAT REPORT Appendix VI-I.
83. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
84. WHEAT REPORT 196.
85. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
86. WHEAT REPORT 194.
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (a) (2) (1969).
88. WHEAT REPORT 197-99.
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respect to the security in an inter-dealer quotation service (commonly
called "sheets" by the financial community). The Study recommended that
brokers be allowed to inquire, regarding the security to be sold, of any
bona fide broker-dealer regardless of whether the broker-dealer had re-
cently appeared in the "sheets" in respect to that security.8 9 Finally, a
broker handling a Rule 154 order must remove himself from the "sheets"
with respect to that security.90 The Study's proposed rule would allow a
broker to remain in the "sheets" while handling a secondary distribution
sale, if the broker was a bona fide market maker for that security.91
iii. Mandatory Holding Period
The Study recognized that, under the proposed rules, one way to
avoid registration would be to use ostensible private purchasers as conduits
for the sale of securities to the public. Accordingly, it was felt that a
mandatory holding period was necessary for securities purchased in a pri-
vate placement from the issuer or from a control person. Thus, the Study
recommended a holding period of one year during which a private pur-
chaser could not in any event resell the securities publicly without regis-
tration.92 The purchaser could, of course, resell the securities during the
period in other than a public transaction, e.g. another private placement.
A concept of fungibility would be used so that if during the holding period
the holder had purchased any additional restricted securities of the same
issuer, the one-year holding period for all of the restricted securities would
be measured from the last purchase of restricted securities.9 3 Purchases of
securities of the same class in the open market (thus not "restricted securi-
ties") and sales of either restricted or unrestricted securities would not
affect the period of holding. If the securities were obtained through
pledges, gifts, death, or distribution of a trust corpus upon termination,
the holder would be allowed to "tack" the length of time the transferor
had held the securities onto the length of time any holder has held the
securities.9 4 If the securities were obtained in exchange for the surrender
of other securities, e.g. in a business combination or on the conversion of
convertible securities, the period that the surrendered securities were held
would also count toward the necessary one year holding period.95 Securi-
ties acquired by reason of a stock dividend, stock split, or recapitalization
would be considered to have been held for the same period as the under-
lying securities. 96
89. Id. at 196, Appendix VI-1.
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 20, 1966).
91. WHEAT REPORT 196, Appendix VI-1.
92. Id. at 199-200.
93. An exception to this fungibility provision would be made for securities
privately purchased through the exercise of qualified or restricted stock options.
Exercise of such options would not affect the holding period of shares previously
purchased in connection with an option exercise.
94. WHEAT REPORT 200-01, 238-89.
95. Id. at 201, 237-38.
96. Id. at 241-43.
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iv. Transactions Not Constituting "Distribution"
With the above interpretation of the term "distribution," a purchaser
of securities in a private placement may in some instances make limited
public sales of the securities purchased without being an "underwriter," and
thus utilize the exemption from registration given by section 4 (1). Under
present interpretations, a transaction will involve a public offering if any
resale is made, and thus the issuer may not utilize the section 4 (2) private
offering exemption. Therefore, the Study proposed that a rule be adopted
that would prevent loss of the section 4 (2) exemption from occurring as
the result of any public resale transactions which are excepted from the
proposed definition of "distribution."97
3. Practical Consequences of the Proposals
If Company A sells a block of its securities to B in a private placement,
under the Study's proposed rules, the securities would be "restricted securi-
ties" for a five-year period because they were obtained in other than a
public offering or public transaction. Without registration, B may not sell
the securities publicly for one year.98 After the one-year holding period,
if Company A is a reporting company that is not delinquent in the filing
of the required reports, B may sell, without registration, a limited quantity
of the securities in ordinary brokerage transactions in any six month period
without the sale being a "distribution." Since it is a "restricted security"
but is not being disposed of in a "distribution," B will not be considered
an "underwriter" and thus will have the benefit of the section 4 (1) exemp-
tion. The securities will no longer be "restricted securities" in the hands
of B's purchaser because the chain of transactions from the issuer to him
now includes a public transaction. Although there has in effect been a
public disposition of some of Company A's securities that were privately
placed with B, the Study's proposed rules would allow Company A to
utilize the section 4 (2) exemption for the initial placement with B.
If during the one year holding period in the above example B buys
and/or sells other securities of Company A of the same class in the trading
markets, the holding period is not affected. If B buys or obtains other
restricted securities during the holding period, he must then hold all of
the restricted securities until their entire one year holding period has ex-
pired before he may utilize the ordinary brokerage transaction and sec-
tion 4 (1) exemption as described in the preceding paragraph. If the addi-
tional securities were obtained by B by reason of gift, death, or termination
of a bona fide trust, he may "tack" to the transferor's holding period to
determine if the one year holding period has expired.
In the above example, if Company A had not been a '34 Act reporting
company (or was delinquent in its reports), any public disposition, without
registration, of the securities would be a "distribution" of "restricted securi-
97. Id. at 205-06.
98. This, og course, does not stop B from selling the securities publicly and
utilizing an exemption other than section 4 (1). For example, he could use Regula-
tion A or the intrastate exemption of section 3 (a) (11).
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des" under the proposed rule.9 9 Therefore, the proposed rules would deem
him an "underwriter," regardless of his intent at the time he purchased
the securities, and the section 4 (1) exemption would be unavailable. If,
during the five-year period that the securities are "restricted securities,"
Company A becomes a '34 Act reporting company and is not delinquent
in its reports, B may at that time utilize the ordinary brokerage transaction
and the section 4 (1) exemption as described in preceding paragraphs.
Two additional consequences of the Study's proposed rules need spe-
cial attention. They are the effects the proposed rules will have on the
private placement of convertible securities and on pledges of restricted
securities. Presently, under Rule 155,100 privately placed securities which
are immediately convertible can never be sold publicly without registration.
Upon conversion of the securities, no matter when it occurs, the securities
cannot then be publicly sold unless it is demonstrated that at the time of
conversion they were acquired with "investment intent." Rule 155 was
adopted by the SEC to prevent the private placement of convertible securi-
ties from being a device for placing unregistered common stock in inter-
state public markets.
Under the proposed rules, the convertible securities would be "re-
stricted securities" and when a conversion is made, the securities received
would also be "restricted securities." The one-year holding period would
be measured for both the convertible or the converted securities from the
time the convertible securities were obtained. In all other respects the con-
vertible or the converted securities would be dealt with under the proposed
rules as "restricted securities." Thus, there would no longer be a need
for Rule 155.
The resale of pledged securities is presently controlled by the doctrine
set forth in SEC v. Guild Films Co.,101 and essentially consists of two
propositions. First, a pledgee is considered to stand in the shoes of the
pledgor and to act for the pledgor when it sells the collateral; and second,
the pledgee can therefore sell the collateral without registration only if an
exemption is available which would have permitted the pledgor to sell the
same shares without registration.1 02 The Study recommended that this
doctrine be completely discarded. Under the proposed rules if securities
are transferred to a pledgee in a bona fide pledge, they will be "restricted
securities" if they are: (1) already restricted securities, (2) pledged by
the issuer, or (3) pledged by a person in a control relationship with the
issuer, even though they may not have been restricted securities in the
control person's hands as in the case of securities purchased on the mar-
ket. Since the securities are restricted securities in the pledgee's hands, the
pledgee has the same limitations on disposition of the securities as any other
holder of restricted securities. If the pledgee does dispose of the securities
99. Again, B could still publicly dispose of the securities by using Regulation A
or the exemption of § 3 (a) (11).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (1969).
101. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 819(1960).
102. WHmAT REPORT 239.
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in a non-public transaction, the proposed rules allow the transferee to "tack'"
the holding period of both the pledgor and pledgee.
E. Brokers' Transactions
Section 4 (4) of the '33 Act exempts from registration "brokers' trans-
actions executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the over-
the-counter market, but not solicitation of such orders."' 03 The broker's
exemption was placed in the '33 Act to give brokers an exemption when
conducting normal brokerage transactions for a customer that was utilizing
the section 4 (1) exemption, 0 4 thus allowing an open market for securities
at all times. The SEC's opinion in Ira Haupt & Co. 10 5 left the impression
that any sale of unregistered securities to the public on behalf of a control
person might violate the '38 Act. This resulted in adoption of Rule 154
which allows brokers to sell a limited quantity of securities for a control
person. If the broker is unaware of circumstances indicating that the
control person is making a public distribution of the securities, he escapes
liability through Rule 154 even though the control person has violated
the '33 Act.' 06 However, if the broker sells securities for a non-control
shareholder who, under section 2 (11), is an underwriter of the securities
and is violating the '38 Act by not registering the securities, the broker is also
an underwriter and in violation of the '33 Act. The Study recommended the
Rule 154 be revised to protect a broker if, after reasonable inquiry, he has no
grounds to believe and does not believe that his customer's sales amount
to a "distribution" under the proposed rules.10 7
IV. CONCLUSION
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,' 08 the Supreme Court decided that if
offerees of a security need the protection that disclosure made available in
the registration process, and if the offerees do not have access to the in-
formation that would be disclosed, i.e., the offerees are not "able to fend
for themselves," the private offering exemption of section 4 (2) of the '33
Act would not be available. On careful analysis, the criteria of "need" and
"access" seem to have dictated most of the proposals made by the Wheat
Report.1oD That is, disclosure is required if the investors need the protec-
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (4) (1964).
104. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
105. Ira Haupt & Company, 23 SEC 589 (1946).
106. U.S. v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946
(1969).
107. WHEAT REPORT 224.
108. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
109. One exception to this statement is particularly notable. This is the auto-
matic removal of the restrictions on a "restricted security" aftei a five-year period
if the issuer is an active, going business. After the restrictions are removed, the
securities may be sold to the public without registration irrespective of the investing
public's need for the protection of disclosure or access to the pertinent information
provided by disclosure. Although this seems at variance with the '33 Act's objective
of providing disclosure, there is justification for the removal of the restrictions after
a certain period of time. Perpetual restraints on alienation are, and for a long
period of time have been, looked upon with great disfavor. Moreover, as a practical
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tion offered by such disclosure, and the information is not otherwise ac-
cessible under the reporting requirements of the '34 Act. For example, for
the average "small time" investor, who is investing in a first public offer-
ing, the proposals seek to give protection by disclosure through more
readable and understandable prospectuses; by requiring a preliminary
prospectus to be delivered to the investor; and by restricting other pub-
licity that would tend to "condition" the investor to the extent that in-
formation in the prospectuses would be disregarded. On the other hand,
the proposals limit the disclosure required in prospectuses for a public
offering by an issuer that is required to report under the '34 Act since
the relevant information is already available to the interested investor.
Similarly, the criteria of "need" and "access" can be found in the pro-
posals relating to secondary distributions. If securities which have been
obtained in a private offering are held for one year, and the issuer is a '34
Act reporting company (i.e., anyone has access to information about the
company through the reports filed with the SEC), a limited quantity of
the securities may be sold to the public in ordinary brokerage transactions
without registration. Conversely, if the issuer is not a '34 Act reporting
company, and thus a public investor would have no access to information
about the company, the securities may not be sold to the public without
registration.
The coordination that the Wheat Report has attempted to achieve
is particularly significant since lack of coordination of disclosure between
the '33 and '34 Acts has been a major weakness of securities law since
passage of the '34 Act.1 1 0 As a result of the 1964 amendments to the '34
Act, companies with over one million dollars in assets and 500 shareholders
are subject to extensive reporting and proxy requirements of the '84 Act.
Yet, when these companies make a public offering of a security, the '33 Act
requires disclosure of basically the same information that has been previ-
ously disclosed under the '34 Act. This duplication is costly in both time and
money without being of any significant benefit to the investing public.
If the desired coordination between the two acts is achieved, the Wheat
Report should be considered a significant factor in the development of
securities regulation.
To attain such significance, however, it is obvious that the proposals
must be adopted by the SEC. Fortunately, in the time since the publication
of the Wheat Report, the SEC has moved rapidly to adopt or formally
propose many of the proposals discussed in this comment. For example,
on September 6, 1969, the SEC proposed amendments to Form S-7 which
matter it is doubtful if the five-year holding period would be used to escape the
registration requirements. Finally, the sale of restricted securities, or the sale after
the restrictions are removed, is not exempted from the anti-fraud provision of the
'33 Act. Therefore, if the securities were intentionally held for the five-year period
for the purpose of selling to the public without disclosure, it would seem that a
case of fraud, and thus liability, could easily be established.
110. Although lack of coordination of disclosure has existed since the passage
of the '34 Act, it has become a burden to companies that have securities traded only
"over-the-counter" since adoption of the 1964 amendments to the '34 Act, which
greatly extended the reporting requirements. Thus, the loudest cry for coordination
of disclosure requirements has come in recent years. See note 7 supra.
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would greatly increase the availability of this form, as well as require the
inclusion of a "source and application of funds" statement as recommended
by the Wheat Report."' A short form of registration statement, to be
called Form S-16, has been proposed for use in the instances recommended
by the Wheat Report."12 An amendment to Rule 174 which would eliminate
the 40-day requirement for prospectus delivery in the case of securities of an
issuer required to report by the '34 Act has been proposed along with
adoption of Rule 15 (c)2-8.113 The latter rule would require a broker-dealer
who is participating in an offering to take "reasonable steps" to secure a
copy of a prospectus for any person requesting one, require the offering
salesman to be furnished with a prospectus, and require the managing un-
derwriter to see that distributing broker-dealers have enough copies of the
prospectus to comply with the rule and section 5 of the '33 Act.
Further rules have been proposed to implement the proposals made by
the Wheat Report in regard to the "gun jumping" doctrine.11 4 Also, al-
though not suggesting the adoption of rules, the SEC has set out its
views regarding any possible conflict between the restrictions of the "gun
jumping" doctrine and the duty of issuers to disclose material corporate
events as developed by Texas Gulf Sulphur and related cases."5
In the area of secondary distributions and brokers transactions, the
SEC has moved rapidly to propose the adoption of rules which would
implement all of the Wheat Report proposals discussed above in sub-
stantially the same form, with one major exception. 1 6 This exception is
the Study's proposal that the SEC publish and maintain an up-to-date
"Qualified List" of issuers whose securities may be sold in limited quan-
tities through ordinary brokerage transactions in a secondary distribution
without registration. Although the SEC does not suggest adoption of this
recommendation, it will offer a service by which an interested person
can obtain the information upon inquiry.1 7
The Wheat Report thus represents a major step forward by the SEC.
Many problems and problem areas that have existed in the securities field
for many years have been thoroughly studied and proposals for their solu-
tion suggested. As noted above, the SEC has proposed to adopt most of the
Wheat Report's proposals discussed in this comment. Professor Kenneth
Davis, in his treatise on administrative law,"18 is critical of regulatory
agencies for "holding back from the use of their rule making power" and
111. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4996 (Sept. 6, 1969).
112. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5011 (Oct. 7, 1969).
113. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5010 (Oct. 7, 1969).
114. Id.
115. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5009 (Oct. 7, 1969).
116. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 6, 1969).
117. It is important to note that the adoption of the rules proposed in Release
No. 4997, supra, note 116, relating to secondary distributions and brokers transac-
tions is conditioned on the SEC adopting the proposals made by the Wheat Report
in regard to improved reporting under the '34 Act. However, there should be little
difficulty in meeting this condition because in SEC Securities Act Releases Nos.
8680-8686 (Sept. 6, 1969), the SEC proposed to adopt most of the Wheat Report's
recommendations on improving reporting under the '34 Act.
118. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TR.ATIsE § 6.13 (1965 Supp.).
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